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T H E O D O R W . A D O R N O
Notes on Beckett*
Translated by Dirk Van Hulle and Shane Weller
In 1994, the Frankfurter Adorno Blätter (published by the Theodor
W. Adorno Archiv) published a dossier, compiled, introduced and
annotated by Rolf Tiedemann, documenting Adorno’s reading of
Beckett’s works. Tiedemann notes that Adorno worked on his essay
‘Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen’ from the summer of 1960 to
the next spring (Tiedemann, 1994, 26). The text of the essay was
mainly written in September 1961. At the end of that month, on
27 February 1961, he presented parts of it at the celebration in
Beckett’s honour, organised by the German publisher Suhrkamp
in Frankfurt am Main.
The next year, in the spring of 1962, Adorno read L’Innommable
in a first edition of the German translation by Elmar Tophoven
(1959), making notes, both in the margins and on seven pages of the
preliminary pages of his copy of Der Namenlose. Rolf Tiedemann
also provides some notes Adorno took after a few conversations
* Adorno’s notes on Beckett were first published in Frankfurter Adorno Blätter III
(1994). They appear here in English with the permission of Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin.
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with Samuel Beckett (between 1958 and 1968) and a letter Adorno
sent to Beckett on 4 February 1969.
The present translation focuses on the notes Adorno took to
prepare his essay ‘Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen’ (relating the
notes to relevant corresponding passages in the essay, translated as
‘Trying to Understand Endgame’ by Michael T. Jones, New German
Critique 26, Spring-Summer 1982, pp. 119–50, and by Shierry Weber
Nicholsen in Theodor W. Adorno, Notes to Literature, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1991, pp. 241–75) and on his notes for
a planned, but never realised essay on L’Innommable. Whenever
Adorno had used a particular note while he was writing up his
essay on Endgame, he usually struck it through. To indicate this, we
have applied Rolf Tiedemann’s editorial notation, marking these
passages by striking through their source reference. An indication
of corresponding passages in Michael T. Jones’s translation of
the essay follows after the relevant note; page references to the
German original in Noten zur Literatur (Adorno, 1981) are followed
by the page numbers in Jones’s translation (Adorno, 1982). The
aim in this translation has been to preserve the telegraphic
and sometimes awkward phrasing of the German. On occasion,
however, words or phrases have been added for clarification: these
appear in square brackets. All underlinings are in the original.
The translation follows the chronology of Adorno’s notes; the two
essays discussing these notes follow the chronology of Beckett’s
works. We wish to thank Mark Nixon, Ben Hutchinson and Anna
Katharina Schaffner for their extremely helpful suggestions on the
translation.
Translation of Adorno’s Notes on Endgame
[note 1] One of the possible aspects: literature in the age of the
impossibility of humour. What has become of humour. Residual
humour. – Humour as regression (clown).
(Notebook G, p. 83)
[300; trans. 134: ‘Psychoanalysis explains clownish humor as a
regression back to a primordial ontogenetic level, and Beckett’s
Notes on Beckett 159
regressive play descends to that level. But the laughter it
inspires ought to suffocate the laughter. That is what happened
to humor, after it became – as an aesthetic medium – obsolete
(. . . )’]
[note 2] In empirical existence there are innumerable situations
which – detached from their pragmatic and psychological context –
objectively assume an expression of their own. An old man takes a
nap and pulls a handkerchief over his eyes. Completely harmless
in natural life: the horror that emanates from it when isolated
in a tableau vivant. B[eckett]’s method consists in releasing such
situations and their expression, assembling them in a second,
autonomous context. Affinity with the relationship between music
and intentions. In a desultory way already in Kafka; in B[eckett]
turned into a consistent principle (like serial music vis-à-vis
Schönberg). NB Beckett’s criticism of Kafka.
(Notebook G, p. 87ff.)
[297–98; trans. 132: ‘then “HAMM: Old stancher! (Pause.)
You. . . remain.” Such situations, emancipated from their
context and from personal character, are reconstructed in a
second autonomous context, just as music joins together the
intentions and states of expression immersed in it until its
sequence becomes a structure in its own right.’]
[note 3] The background. In The Wild Duck, Hjalmar forgets to
bring the menu of the dinner at the old Werle’s to his daughter,
as promised. This is psychologically motivated and at the same
time symbolic in the strict sense of Freudian parapraxis. When this
symbolism is disconnected from its psychological determination, it
simultaneously acquires an objective, concrete aspect; it becomes
the carrier of the dramatic idea, as in the later works (e.g. the
clerk [Vilhelm Foldal] being run over in John Gabriel Borkman). If,
from these objective symbols, one extracts those meanings, the
relationship with the – problematic – idea, one is left with code
signs of an x. That is the genesis of the absurd. – Beckett relates
to Kafka the way the serial composers relate to Schönberg. His
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criticism of Kafka contains the same problem as the integral
composition in its relationship to the antagonistic one.
(Notebook G, p. 93)
[304; trans. 137: ‘What becomes of form in Endgame can be
virtually reconstructed from literary history. In Ibsen’s The
Wild Duck, the degenerate photographer Hjalmar Ekdal –
himself a potential anti-hero (. . . ) the accountant Foldal is
overcome by so-called “youth.”‘]
[305; trans. 137: ‘Drama need only become aware of the
ineluctably ridiculous nature of such pan-symbolism, which
destroys itself; it need only take that up and utilise it, and
Beckettian absurdity is already achieved as a result of the
immanent dialectic of form. Not meaning anything becomes
the only meaning.’]
[303; trans. 136: ‘Beckett’s drama is heir to Kafka’s novels, to
whom he stands in a similar relation as the serial composers to
Schönberg.’]
[note 4] The great closing scene in Fin de partie is the parody of the
scène à faire, become impossible.
(Notebook G, p. 97)
[note 5] The origin of the notion of the situation in Jaspers has to
be noted, and at the same time the difference from it – from his
subjectivism – needs to be sharply determined. In this regard, com-
pare Rickert’s passage on the physiognomy of the objective mind.
(Notebook G, p. 100.1)
[294; trans. 129: ‘It [the “situation”] is defined by Jaspers as “a
reality for an existing subject who has a stake in it” (. . . ) he also
calls it “not just a reality governed by natural laws. It is a sense-
related reality,” a reality moreover which, strangely enough,
is said by Jaspers to be “neither psychological nor physical,
but both in one.” When situation becomes – in Beckett’s
view – actually both, it loses its existential-ontological consti-
tuents: personal identity and meaning.’]
[295; trans. 130: ‘These Beckettian situations which
constitute his drama are the negative of meaningful reality.
(. . . ) Beckett’s treatment of these situations, that panicky
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and yet artificial derivation of simplistic slapstick comedy of
yesteryear, articulates a content noted already in Proust. In his
posthumous work Immediacy and Sense-Interpretation, Heinrich
Rickert considers the possibility of an objective physiognomy
of mind (. . . )’]
[note 6] The enigmatic and the physiognomy of the objective mind.
The situations say something – but what? NB very similar to music.
(Notebook G, p. 100.2)
[296; trans. 130–31: ‘The physiognomy of objective expression
however retains an enigma. The situations say something, but
what?’ (. . . ) Proust, in a subterranean mystical tradition, still
clings affirmatively to that physiognomy, as if involuntary
memory disclosed a secret language of things; in Beckett, it
becomes the physiognomy of what is no longer human. (. . . )
[132] Such situations, emancipated from their context and from
personal character, are reconstructed in a second autonomous
context, just as music joins together the intentions and states
of expression (. . . )’]
[note 7] The simplest not to be withheld: the experience of existence
as absurd. Yet this experience is not ontological but historical.*
[*(note by Adorno) Absurdity has its historical side: for people do
not themselves determine their lives in a transparent way.] The
basis of this experience is the loss of faith in providence and a
meaningful encapsulation of life; the explosion of cosmology; the
dilapidation and problematisation of order-producing structures
to which that meaning used to be attached; the immediate threat
to the survival of the species. As soon as reason, released and
terminal, needs to look for a meaning, it has no other answer than
this nothingness: it is the apriori of the question. In this context,
it is crucial that such historical answers always necessarily appear
to be ontological, without history; that is precisely the blinding
element, the bewitchment. B[eckett]’s genius is that he has captured
this semblance of the non-historical, of the condition humaine, in
historical images, and thus transfixed it. The ideology of the
condition humaine is replaced by dialectical images.
(Notebook G, p. 100ff.)
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[287; trans. 123: ‘What would be called the condition humaine
in existentialist jargon is the image of the last human, which
is devouring the earlier ones – humanity. Existential ontol-
ogy asserts the universally valid in a process of abstraction
which is not conscious of itself. While it still – according
to the old phenomenological doctrine of the intuition of
essence – behaves as if it were aware, even in the particular,
of its binding determinations, thereby unifying apriority
and concreteness, it nonetheless distills out what appears to
transcend temporality.’]
[319; trans. 148: ‘The historical inevitability of this absurdity
allows it to seem ontological; that is the veil of delusion pro-
duced by history itself. Beckett’s drama rips through this veil.
The immanent contradiction of the absurd, reason terminating
in senselessness, emphatically reveals the possibility of a truth
which can no longer even be thought; it undermines the ab-
solute claim exercised by what merely is. Negative ontology is
the negation of ontology: history alone has brought to maturity
what was appropriated by the mythic power of timelessness.’]
[note 8] There is something absurd in the form of the dialogue
itself; meaninglessness of the question-and-answer relationship;
gibberish (connection with Ionesco); chatter as trivial reflex of
the objective world, second language. Hearing oneself talking is
like watching a Beckett play. Analyse this moment accurately. One
is alienated from one’s own language by B[eckett].* [*(note by
Adorno) Situation: One cannot talk any longer. Text p. 22.]
(Notebook G, p. 102)
[305; trans. 138: ‘Rather than striving to liquidate the
discursive element of language through pure sound, Beckett
turns that element into an instrument of its own absurdity
and he does that according to the ritual of clowns, whose
babbling becomes nonsensical by presenting itself as sense.
The objective disintegration of language – that simultaneously
stereotyped and faulty chatter of self-alienation, where word
and sentence melt together in human mouths – penetrates
the aesthetic arcanum. The second language of those falling
silent, a conglomeration of insolent phrases, pseudo-logical
Notes on Beckett 163
connections, and galvanised words appearing as commodity
signs – as the desolate echo of the advertising world – is
“refunctioned” (umfunktioniert) into the language of a poetic
work that negates language. Beckett thus approximates the
drama of Eugène Ionesco.’]
[note 9] The play is the only attempt in grand style to hold out
against the potential of total destruction – like Picasso’s Guernica,
Schönberg’s Survivor [from Warsaw, Op. 46, 1947] against the
horrors of the Hitler era. With utmost decisiveness B[eckett]
has stuck to the narrow ridge of what is still possible. On the
one hand he has realised that absolute destruction – to which
no individual human being’s experience extends – cannot become
thematic directly. The word atom does not appear (although
it does in the corollary All That Fall). There are no atomic
conflicts à la Blaues Licht. Everything is shown only through
the reflection of the experience, as it were in a subcutaneous
expressionistic inwardness (reminiscent of Strindberg’s Dödsdansen
[The Dance of Death]). Absolute limit of technological utopia, of
science fiction. But at the same time the possibility of experience,
and the number of subjects, is so reduced that it can only be
conceived as a consequence of the catastrophe. In a way the latter
endorses the process of historical regression. – On the other hand
nothing evaporates into the purely symbolical. The situations are
real, and they are pragmatic presuppositions (partial end of the
world), developed with utmost discretion. Parody of the exposition
in traditional drama, in which the background information is
presented, dispersed (end of organic life, the sunken lighthouse.
The protagonists’ blindness and paralysis as consequence of the
catastrophe?[)] – It is as if consciousness wished to endure the
end of its own physical presence, while looking it in the face.
Connection with Proust.
(Notebook G, p. 103ff.)
[321; trans. 150: ‘Consciousness begins to look its own demise
in the eye, as if it wanted to survive the demise, as these
two want to survive the destruction of their world. Proust,
about whom the young Beckett wrote an essay, is said to have
attempted to keep protocol on his own struggle with death,
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in notes which were to be integrated into the description of
Bergotte’s death. Endgame carries out this intention like a
mandate from a testament.’]
[note 10] In my work on Kafka, I have reproached Gide for his stage
adaptation [of Kafka’s The Trial], arguing that drama is not possible
without subject and freedom. That is where Fin de partie sets in. The
question is: what is possible in terms of drama without subject and
without the possibility of freedom. It is precisely in this way that
the play becomes a parody of drama and all its categories.
(Notebook G, p. 105)
[302; trans. 136: ‘Dramatic categories as a whole are treated just
like humor. All are parodied. But not ridiculed. (. . . )’]
[note 11] Parody of drama = drama in the age of its impossibility.
In tragedy, stychomythia served as a tool to tighten the dramatic
tension to the utmost: quintessence of antithesis. Here it turns into
slackening: less and less talkative protagonists, complete regression
(as in positivism: talking in short sentences).
(Notebook G, p. 106.1)
[303; trans. 136–37: ‘For example, tragedy, at the height of
its plot and with antithesis as its quintessence [trans. We-
ber: ‘as the quintessence of antithesis’; Adorno, 1991, 260],
manifested the utmost tightening of the dramatic thread,
stichomythia – dialogues in which the trimester spoken by
one person follows that of the other. (. . . ) Beckett employs it
as if the detonation had revealed what was buried in drama.
Endgame contains rapid, monosyllabic dialogues, like the
earlier question-and-answer games between the blinded king
and fate’s messenger. But where the bind tightened then, the
speakers now grow slack. Short of breath until they almost
fall silent, they no longer manage the synthesis of linguistic
phrases; they stammer in protocol sentences that might stem
from positivists or Expressionists.’]
[note 12] The Endgame is a draw, isn’t it?
(Notebook G, p. 106.2)
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[note 13] Tremendous richness of allusions and links: the malignant
joke, she cries ergo she lives etc., as in [Herman] Bang.
(Notebook G, p. 107)
[note 14] The relation to history is expressed by means of a taboo.
The shock is such that it cannot be talked about. It is even noticeable
in the way the play is composed. The catastrophe, which is clearly
the pragmatic presupposition, cannot be named. Corresponds
more or less to the way people in Germany in 1960 talk about the
murder of the Jews in attenuating allusions.
(Notebook G, p. 109ff.)
[287; trans. 123: ‘The violence of the unspeakable is mimicked
by the timidity to mention it. Beckett keeps it nebulous. One
can only speak euphemistically about what is incommensurate
with all experience, just as one speaks in Germany of the
murder of the Jews.’]
[note 15] What about the game of chess?
1) the empty field, remainder, the destruction only allegorically
readable in the result.
2) endgames are regulated, prescribed by a system; they can only
change by means of errors, not by means of preferences.
3) as in chess, winners and losers are dependent on each
other.
4) chess as a situation (separated from human beings, and yet
they are present through the agency of the king. The king is
the remainder of the subject). The meaninglessness, the folly
in the game’s seriousness.
5) in the endgame, the best that can happen to the losing party
is a draw. Situations such as stalemate, perpetual check. Bad
infinity.
(Notebook G, p. 110ff.)
[288; trans. 125: ‘Drama falls silent and becomes gesture, frozen
amid the dialogues. Only the result of history appears – as
decline.’]
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[316; trans. 146: ‘The field is almost empty, and what happened
before can only be poorly construed from the positions of the
few remaining figures.’]
[316; trans. 146: ‘Only artistic mistakes or accidents, such
as something growing somewhere, could cause unforeseen
events (. . . )’]
[316; trans. 146: ‘Hamm is the king, about whom everything
turns and who can do nothing himself. The incongruity bet-
ween chess as pastime and the excessive effort involved (. . . )’]
[316; trans. 146: ‘Whether the game ends with stalemate or
with perpetual check, or whether Clov wins, remains unclear,
as if clarity in that would already be too much meaning.’]
[293; trans. 128: ‘While meanings in Kafka were beheaded or
confused, Beckett calls a halt to the bad infinity of intentions:
their sense is senselessness.’]
[note 16] Beckett[:] something about existentialism’s change of
function and its cause needs to be included in the text
(Notebook G, p. 111)
[note 16a] ‘simple fare’ [Hausmannskost]: The totalitarians’ ranting
against decadence has its reason. It has to do with utopia. What a
quantity of satiation, tedium, dégoût is needed to want something
that would be completely different. The newcomer is impressed
by everything that is, to such an extent that he never rises against
it. Health means: to make do with the nourishment offered. (see
Tiedemann, 1994, 75 note 28)
[283–84; trans. 121: ‘Totalitarians like Lukács, who rage
against the – truly terrifying – simplifier as “decadent,” are not
ill advised by the interests of their bosses. They hate in Beckett
what they have betrayed. Only the nausea of satiation – the
tedium of spirit with itself – wants something completely
different: prescribed “health” nevertheless makes do with
the nourishment offered, with simple fare. Beckett’s dégoût
cannot be forced to fall in line.’]
[note 17] A primitive historical intention would be just as senseless
as the ontological intention attributed to B[eckett] by Lukács.
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No struggle against atomic death. Neither condition humaine nor
Ape and Essence. A third option: the horror of the whole flares up
in – only in – that of the last element (proofs). The human being as
what he became. The fate of the species is decided upon on its last
day – as in utopia.
B[eckett]’s refusal to explain (difference from Sartre and Camus)
corresponds with the unsolvability. But as little of a realist or realist-
symbolist as Kafka. Whereas in Kafka meaning is broken off or
confused, one could perhaps say that in B[eckett] the meaning
is the meaninglessness (parody of philosophy, which transfigures
thrownness into meaning). But it is not a universal – which would
turn it into an idea again – but the expression of more specific
situations than its horror.
(Notebook G, p. 112ff.)
[293; trans. 128: ‘While meanings in Kafka were beheaded or
confused, Beckett calls a halt to the bad infinity of intentions:
their sense is senselessness. Objectively and without any
polemical intent, that is his answer to existential philosophy,
which under the name of “thrownness” and later of “absur-
dity” transforms senselessness itself into sense, exploiting the
equivocations inherent in the concept of sense. To this Beckett
juxtaposes no world view, rather he takes it at its word. What
becomes of the absurd, after the characters of the meaning of
existence have been torn down, is no longer a universal – the
absurd would then be yet again an idea – but only pathetic
details which ridicule conceptuality (. . . )’]
[note 18] Heidegger’s states of being [Befindlichkeiten], Jaspers’
situations have become materialistic in B[eckett]. The threshold
against existentialism is the denial of inwardness.
(Notebook G, p. 114.1)
[293; trans. 129: ‘Removed from their inwardness, Heidegger’s
states of being (Befindlichkeiten) and Jaspers’ “situations” have
become materialistic (. . . ) As soon as the subject is no longer
doubtlessly self-identical, no longer a closed structure of
meaning, the line of demarcation with the exterior becomes
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blurred, and the situations of inwardness become at the same
time physical ones.’]
[note 19] The humour of the last human being: that is the humour
that can no longer count on any laughing. B[eckett] has recovered
for humour what otherwise only applies to the categories of the
Arts with a capital A – which he tacitly liquidates: the resignation
of communication.
(Notebook G, p. 114.2)
[301; trans. 134: ‘Beckett carries out the verdict on humor. The
jokes of the damaged people are themselves damaged. They
no longer reach anybody (. . . )’]
[307; trans. 139: ‘Communication, the universal law of clichés,
proclaims that there is no more communication. The absurdity
of all speaking is not unrelated to realism but rather develops
from it. For communicative language postulates – already in
its syntactic form, through logic, the nature of conclusions,
and stable concepts – the principle of sufficient reason. Yet this
requirement is hardly met anymore (. . . )’]
[note 20] The play takes place in a no man’s land, a zone of
indifference between inner and outer. What remains of these two
in a state of complete alienation. Concentration camp, intermediate
domain between life and death, life as a knacker’s yard.
(Notebook G, p. 114ff.)
[292; trans. 127–28: ‘Endgame takes place in a zone of indiffer-
ence between inner and outer, neutral between – on the one
hand – the “materials” without which subjectivity could not
manifest itself or even exist, and – on the other – an animating
impulse which blurs the materials, as if that impulse had
breathed on the glass through which they are viewed.’]
[293; trans. 128: ‘Endgame occupies the nadir of what philo-
sophy’s construction of the subject-object confiscated at its
zenith: pure identity becomes the identity of annihilation,
identity of subject and object in the state of complete
alienation.’]
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[note 21] Essence and existentialism. Break from rationalism. Focus
on the essential. Expression of increasing irrationality. Through
polemic against rationalism and positivism not apologetic. Lacking
the theological, both open and hidden. – Residues of global
annihilation.
(Notebook G, p. 115.1)
[note 22] Existence in Beckett: minimum of existence.
(Notebook G, p. 115.2)
[284; trans. 121: ‘Existentialism itself is parodied; nothing
remains of its “invariants” other than minimal existence.’]
[note 23] Compare with chapter 6 in my Kafka, beware of overlap.
(Notebook G, p. 115.3)
[Theodor W. Adorno (1998), ‘Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka’, in
Gesammelte Schriften 10.1 (Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft I),
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, pp. 271–73.]
[note 24] Parody of both philosophy and drama (the two converge:
revolt against the content).
(Notebook G, p. 115.4)
[284; trans. 121: ‘He responds to the cheery call to play
along with parody, parody of the philosophy spit out by his
dialogues as well as parody of forms.’]
[note 25] The end of the world is already discounted.
(Notebook G, p. 115.5)
[286; trans. 123: ‘The end of the world is discounted, as
if it were a matter of course. Every supposed drama of
the atomic age would mock itself, if only because its fable
would hopelessly falsify the horror of historical anonymity by
shoving it into the characters and actions of humans (. . . )’]
[note 26] No individual can lodge complaint any longer
(Wolfskehl). He [Beckett] does not indict society. Certainly not, and
that is precisely the spearhead which he aims at it. Against Lukács
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and vulgar Marxist interpretation. – Presupposition that all of that
is smothered. In time. In addition the missed moment.
(Notebook G, p. 116)
[290, trans. 126: ‘The vanity of the individual who indicts
society, while his rights themselves merge in the accumulation
of the injustice of all individuals – disaster itself – is manifest
in embarrassing declamations like the “Germany” poem of
Karl Wolfskehl. The “too-late,” the missed moment condemns
such bombastic rhetoric to phraseology. Nothing of that sort in
Beckett.’]
[note 27] The hieratic language alone turns the radicalism of
existential ontology into a lie. While one confronts nothingness,
while everything is being questioned, the bathos of this questioning
already warrants the meaning it pretends to know nothing about.
The implicit ‘nevertheless’. Cryptotheology.
(Notebook G, p. 117ff.)
[note 28] Take the theological ‘unto dust shalt thou return’ literally:
filth [Dreck], the most intimate, chamber pot, piss, pills are the
universal as remainder. Abstractionism and concretism.
(Notebook G, p. 119.1)
[321; trans. 150: ‘To be sure, the Old Testament saying “You
shall become dust (Staub) again” is translated here into “dirt”
(Dreck). In the play, the substance of life, a life that is death, is
the excretions.’]
[287; trans. 123–24: ‘Existential ontology asserts the univer-
sally valid in a process of abstraction which is not conscious
of itself. (. . . ) It does so by blotting out particularity – what
is individualized in space and time, what makes existence
existence rather than its mere concept. Ontology appeals to
those who are weary of philosophical formalism but who yet
cling to what is only accessible formally. To such unacknowl-
edged abstraction, Beckett affixes the caustic antithesis by
means of acknowledged subtraction. (. . . ) He lengthens the
escape route of the subject’s liquidation to the point where
it constricts into a “this-here,” whose abstractness – the loss
Notes on Beckett 171
of all qualities – extends ontological abstraction literally ad
absurdum (. . . )’]
[note 29] Homini sapienti sat. Take decadence positively, see p. 112
of this notebook. B[eckett] relates to culture as to a single swarm of
Jugendstil ornaments.
(Notebook G, p. 119.2)
[284; trans. 121: ‘Thoughts are dragged along and distorted like
the day’s left-overs, homo homini sapienti sat.’]
[281; trans. 119: ‘Culture parades before him as the entrails of
Jugendstil ornaments did before that progress which preceded
him, modernism as the obsolescence of the modern. The
regressive language demolishes it.’]
[note 30] The last image is a tableau vivant of a clown,
corresponding exactly to the opening scene: with the exception of
Clov’s possibly decisive travel outfit. Thus it remains open whether
it starts all over again or is finished. Berg (Wozzeck!)
(Notebook G, p. 120)
[314; trans. 145: ‘He does manage to make the decision to go,
even comes in for the farewell (. . . ) a strong, almost musical
conclusion. (. . . ) Aside from some differences, which may be
decisive or completely irrelevant, this is identical with the
beginning.’]
[316; trans. 146: ‘(. . . ) whether Clov wins, remains unclear, as
if clarity in that would already be too much meaning.’]
[note 31] Addition re language. B[eckett]’s progressiveness accords
with an idiosyncratic touchiness against modernism. Removal
of ornaments. In B[eckett], the objectivity is so hidden that – by
removing the meaning – it becomes mysterious and starts to
fluoresce.
(Notebook G, p. 128ff.)
[281; trans. 119: ‘(. . . ) modernism as the obsolescence of
the modern. The regressive language demolishes it. Such
objectivity in Beckett obliterates the meaning that was culture,
along with its rudiments. Culture thus begins to fluoresce.’]
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Translation of Adorno’s Notes on The Unnamable
1
The ‘I’ of the beginning and the one at the beginning of the
Recherche
Prolegomena to B[eckett]
Against the ‘it can’t go on’
Necessity to read each sentence rigorously from beginning
to end
The poem with the outbursts of hatred [i.e. Whoroscope]
[In left-hand margin:] see e.g. p. 103 [p. 338 in Calder edition
of the three novels]
On the situation: absolute alienation is
the absolute subject. But precisely that subject is alienated
from itself, it is the other, it is nothing.
B[eckett]’s novels are the critique of solipsism.
Nothing leads out of this dialectic in his work
At the same time it is the movens: the anything goes
there is an inherently univocal B[eckett] world, like
Kafka’s
[In left-hand margin:] Mahood
B[eckett] reaches the point of indifference between narrative
and theory, just as Marx (and Hegel) wanted
to transform philosophy into history Completion of the
tendency towards
the reflexive novel
[The word ‘novel’ is written in the right-hand margin]
Not despairing: schizoid apathy. Not even
able to suffer any more.
The fact that B[eckett] retains the label ‘novel’. What has
become of the novel.
something infinitely liberating comes from B[eckett] vis-à-vis
death. What is it?
[The next entry is marked with a vertical line in the left-hand
margin]
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Possibility of interpreting B[eckett] as an attempt
to [respond to] the biblical ‘unto dust shalt thou return’. Asking,
as in the
catechism: What does that mean, ‘I am dust’.
Is it consoling that this question is answered?
2
B[eckett]’s deep affinity with music. Like his monologue,
music too always says ‘I’, but its ‘I’ too is
always an other, identical and non-identical
at the same time.
The pantheist says: after death I shall be flower, leaf, earth.
B[eckett] puts this to the test: what am I if I am filth [Dreck].
B[eckett] as parody of the philosophy of the remainder
(full of al-
lusions to Descartes). The p[hilosophy of the remainder] says:
what
remains for me
after the deduction of all costs, surcharges, trimmings, ad-
vertising as absolute certainty – consciousness as
property, the secret of mineness [Jemeinigkeit], which not for no-
thing sounds like meanness [Gemeinheit]. In B[eckett] that
becomes,
sardonically: how can I ligate everything that exists
and also
myself? (This is thought in accordance with the capital-
ist market, which B[eckett] takes at its word.)
Answer: by turning myself into a negative
quantity, into less than nothing (filth and
stump are less than a remnant). The sovereign
ego cogitans is transformed by the dubitatio into
its opposite. And that is what it always was.
For in order to retain itself as absolutely certain
it had to turn itself into ever less. Sov-
ereignty and filth belong together already in
Kafka; in B[eckett] they become one. The Western
process of subjective reduction calls itself by its
proper name.
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There are traces in B[eckett] of an antinomian but
Marcionist theology, like that of God
as a sports fan (in him the Epicurean
gods come into their own). But that too is not to be taken à
la lettre, rather as a grimace.
No?
3
B[eckett] has a panic-stricken fear of tape-recordings and
suchlike. And yet he wrote La Dernière
Bande. A hole into the work? All that
written as an adjuration: in order not to
have to resemble in any way what is presented? B[eckett] – the
composition of his works proves this – has a very strong
‘I’.
The thought of the defensive adjuration and that
of ligation belong immediately together.
From Kafka the most effective motif [is] that of the Hunter
Gracchus. Death, silence, without voices,
as the unattainable goal. Living is dying because it
is a not-being-able-to-die.
The clownish reflections on the work
itself are reminiscent of Gide’s Paludes, in fact
much is – it is, besides Kafka, the most important
link.
The fellow beings – ’they’, the voices – appear
as the absolute negative because they prevent
dying.
The famous metaphysical question: why
is there something and not simply nothing, turns, in
accordance with the form, into something like a Jewish joke:
You’re
right, why on earth is there something and not
simply nothing! (‘You’re right, Lieutenant,
why should the soldier not cross
the parade ground with a lit cigarette
in his mouth.’)
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Criticism of B[eckett] amounts to the statement: but all that
is terrible, it simply cannot be. Answer:
it is terrible.
The question of whether the absolutely qualityless point of in-
difference, which in B[eckett] is the negative, could not
just as well be the positive. But no,
the qualityless, the indeterminate – the
abstract is precisely the negativity.
4
perhaps include the note on nihilism from notebook M
In the light of each new work by B[eckett]
the earlier ones appear simple.
[In left-hand margin:] Difference from Joyce
In B[eckett] there is, as a kind of
counterpoint, something like sound
common sense. Everything
so meaningless, yet at the same time the way one speaks
is so normal, i.e. modern language may have
shrunken – compared with Kafka’s epic language, brought as it
were to
the point of indifference with the absolute subject –
but [it is] never replaced by linguistic absurdity. In that respect
similar to Brecht. Beckett, a Dadaist without Dada.
How my formula of the solipsist without ipse
comes into its own in him.
L’innom[m]able is the negative subject-object
‘Vergammeln’ [To go to seed]. It would be important to know when
this
word first appeared; index of B[eckett]’s historical significance.
What Beckett does is to compose out this word.
Lukács has observed the emancipation
of time empty of meaning in L’Éducation sentimentale. The history
of the novel thereafter is that of the ever more naked emer-
gence of time. With the monologue intérieur
it emancipates itself from that which is, from the existent.
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As a result, however, time itself disintegrates, already in Proust,
completely in L’Innom[m]able. Absolute time
ceases to be time – just as the Kantian con-
ception of time as pure form cannot be maintained,
because it cannot be represented without
the something of which it is the time [ein Woran] (transition to the
dialectic).
pure temps durée turns into
temps espace. That is precisely what occurs in L’I[nnommable].
The spatial interior is merely space,
proofs of that.
Almost all new art has to pay bitterly for the fact that
it cannot hold out at this point [auf dem Punkt]. It cannot
(quote a form). Beckett is the only one who
5
absolutely consistently refuses to go beyond
this point. That is the problem; any jackass
hears the repetition. But that is also precisely his aesth-
etic task: all that is still possible
at one point.
At the end of the work perhaps: The man who
said one doesn’t know whether [one is] living or dead. The
negative truth therein (Kaiser). But
also the contrary, a metaphysics, experience
of a condition beyond death and life
(Kafka!). – No spirits. Indicated
in dreams. What is that.
Perhaps include in the work the notes
taken in Bregenz on nihilism; also a note in an
earlier notebook
Simplest answer to why [L’Innommable is] so enormously
significant:
because it comes closest to the conception of what
it will really be like after death (the innommable dreams it).
Neither spirit nor time nor symbol. This is precisely
the Beckettian no man’s land. With that the obvious
Notes on Beckett 177
(the Kafkan moment): the title of the next
book, Comment c’est, perhaps suits this one
better.
Archetype of a materialist metaphysics.
The novel is completely unrealistic and at the same time
unauratic.
Against the term ‘absurd’. It presupposes
the meaningful as the normal. But that is precisely
the illusion[;] the absurd is the nor-
mal. – That is already manifest in the controversy over ‘story’.
Modern art is the radical heir not only of
avant-garde movements but also
of Naturalism: a disenchanted world, the illu-
sionless, ‘comment c’est’. But
6
Naturalism is still illusionistic in its form,
as though saturated with the toxin of meaning[,] action, etc.
When reading the older naturalists, amaze-
ment at how little naturalist – how badly
stylised they are. B[eckett] gets rid of that, and precisely
in so doing distances himself from the photographic-realist
façade. Naturalism without aura achieves the
aspect which literary criticism then
manipulates as the absurd (NB incommensurability
of Beckett[,] Ionesco and even Camus). In
a second sense, synthesis of radical
Expressionism + Naturalism. – The
disgusting, the decaying [belong to the] imagery both of
Naturalism and of Rimbaud.
Supply a theory of the repellent.
Possibility arising from the doctor’s gaze. The gaze on
the living from the dissection room. The corpse
as the truth about life, what life becomes, and thus
the terrible equality before which everything that counts,
difference, sinks into irrelevance. Hence
the illnesses, mutilations, excretions as
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[7]
the essence of the living. The eccentric is the
rule. Hence also the clown. A living being who
turns himself into an object, thing, football, dead person.
Is nothingness the same as nothing? Everything in B[eckett]
revolves
around that. Absolute discardment, because there is hope only
where nothing is retained. The fullness
of nothingness. That is the reason for the insistence on the
zero point.
Not abstraction but subtraction
